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Abstract: This inquiry seeks to establish that in The Theory of Political Economy, 
W. Stanley Jevons offers a selective interpretation of Jeremy Bentham’s notion of 
utility. Moreover, Jevons does so in a manner that generates enduring implications 
for Economics as a science. Special emphasis is placed upon Jevons’ use of 
Bentham’s understanding of the circumstances that direct pursuits of pleasure and 
avoidance of pain. Emphasized is that Jevons’ omission of ‘fecundity, purity, and 
extent’ as quantifiers of utility, creates enduring implications that emerged years 
after his book’s publication in 1871. What is finally considered are some of the 
difficulties associated with creating and using science, employing as an illustrative 
example, Jevons’ selective use of Bentham’s notion of utility and its implications 
in the formation of neoclassical economics.  
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This inquiry seeks to establish that in his book, The Theory of Political Economy, 
W. Stanley Jevons offers a selective interpretation of Jeremy Bentham’s notion of 
utility that generates long standing implications. Jevons, seeking to establish 
economics as a mathematical science, places Bentham’s narrow notion of utility at 
the core of his thesis. Bentham’s utility – the idea that humans behave in 
accordance with a maximization of pleasure and a minimization of pain – is static 
and simple, reducing human behavior to two categories with seven considerations. 
Despite the simplicity of Bentham’s utility, Jevons reduces it further, considering 
only four of the seven quantifiers of pain and pleasure. Jevons’ selective adoption 
of Bentham’s ideas suggest that a foundational idea of neoclassical economics is 
built unscientific ground.  As a foundational thinker of orthodox economics, 
Jevons’ work impacts decisions made by governments, businesses, and individuals 




In The Theory of Political Economy [1871] (1957), Jevons offers a theory of 
economics that suggests utility is the underlying driver of value. In doing so, 
Jevons (1957, 3) argues that economics should be a purely mathematical science. 
In developing this thesis, Jevons (1957, 4-8) labors to compare his version of 
economics to early stages of sciences like physics and astronomy and contrast it 
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with political economy and other moral sciences. Namely, Jevons makes two 
arguments. First, he disagrees with the labor theory of value, arguing that utility 
provides a more direct and precise manner of determining value. Second, he insists 
that to be a science, economics must fully commit to a mathematical approach.  
Jevons attempts to compare his version of economics to sciences like 
physics and astronomy. Specifically, Jevons’ (1957, 3-11) considers the precision 
and application of mathematical measurement in physical sciences and suggests 
that economics is similar.  He writes that all sciences are inexact in their ability to 
measure, and that this alone does not preclude a method of inquiry from making 
calculations and theories. To illustrate, Jevons argues that just as a physicist must 
make assumptions about the stiffness of a fulcrum, economists must make 
assumptions about the behavior of humans. However, in order to develop a theory 
of economics conformable to mathematics, Jevons needed an underlying theory of 
utility to explain value and human behavior. Instead of developing a unique theory 
of utility, Jevons uses Jeremy Bentham’s. 
Jeremy Betham’s [1780] (1967) Principles of Morals and Legislation 
presents his notion of utility measured by the intensity and duration of pleasure and 
pain. In describing utility, social control expert, Bentham, (1967, 125) writes that 
human behavior can be explained exclusively according to the pursuit of pleasure 
and the avoidance of pain. Utility is the term given to explain the conglomeration 
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of these two separate but similar pursuits. Explaining in further detail, Bentham 
(1967, 126-128) states that utility can be viewed as the property of any object that 
produces an increase in “good” feelings or reduces the happenings of “unhappiness 
or pain.”  Extending this idea, he notes that utility applies to communities only as 
the sum of the utility of its members. In essence, Bentham intends to classify all 
human behaviors into one of two categories—the pursuit of pleasure or the 
avoidance of pain—then explain those behaviors using a single idea, utility. 
When explaining measurements of utility, Bentham offers four metrics for 
individuals and an additional three for groups. Heilbroner (1996, 206) shares 
Bentham’s criteria for quantifying utility. For individuals, intensity, duration, 
certainty and propinquity, of pleasure and pain are considered when making any 
decision, while for a group, the fecundity, purity and extent of actions are 
considered as well. A distinction between the former four and the latter three is 
their relationship to time and to other actors. While duration is considered for 
individual measures of utility, it refers only to the duration of a single action or 
event while both fecundity and purity consider pleasure and pain in a future time 
period. In a similar vein, propinquity allows consideration for other actors near the 
central utility maximizer, while extent measures an unbounded consideration of 
how many others may be impacted by a decision. Jevons completely follows 
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Bentham’s notion of utility, but selectively chooses which considerations are used 
by individuals in economic calculation. 
While undoubtedly committed to following Bentham’s utility, Jevons omits 
fecundity, purity, and extent as considerations in his application. To illustrate the 
degree to which Jevons roots his work in Bentham, consider the proclamation 
Jevons (1957, 28) makes early on in his book, stating that Bentham’s utility must 
be “undoubtedly” accepted, implying that without it, the whole of his argument 
will crumble. While Jevons relies completely on Bentham’s utility, he makes a 
purposeful yet curious decision about its quantification. Jevons (1957, 29) omits 
Bentham’s final three measurements of pleasure and pain: fecundity, purity and 
extent stating that while these considerations are pertinent to theories or ideas 
concerning morality they are not required for the, “more simple and restricted 
problem which we attempt to solve in Economics.”  
It is plausible that in developing this theory, focused on individual marginal 
utility, that Jevons decided only to use the quantifiers Bentham deems appropriate 
for individuals, but that argument is not present. Perhaps Jevons thought this was 
implied, or considered that illuminating such an omission could undermine the 
certainty with which the reader must accept the notion of utility.  
Jevons reduced the scope of economics to allow for its mathematization. In 
doing so, Jevons (1957, 26-27) willingly and purposefully disconnects economics 
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from morality and ethics, explaining that while there are undoubtedly situations 
where the considerations of a neighbor, army, or nation-state could influence 
individual decisions, those situations are not the concern of economics as a 
mathematical science. Going further, Jevons makes it clear that he views 
economics as the study of the basic needs and wants of humanity, and that through 
this rational calculus nearly all of human behavior can be explained. While not 
overtly malicious, Jevons’ selective omission and conscious decision to focus 
solely on measures which placed individual utility at the center of what would 
become and still is neoclassical – orthodox – economics, impacts the direction and 
focus of economics to this day.  
 
Jevons’ Effects on Economics as a Science 
The publication of Jevons’ The Theory of Political Economy marks the beginning 
of the neoclassical revolution. Jevons thesis presents a shift of economics from a 
moral science to a mathematical that was accepted and is still widely held as the 
standard. Jevons’ three central ideas produce unique but connected ramifications 
on economics as a science.  
First, by stating that economics is a mathematical science of rational 
calculus, detached from ethical consideration, Jevons puts economics, on a path 
toward static analysis devoid of the nuance required to understand complex human 
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systems, interactions, and institutions inherent to the subject: the shift from the 
labor theory of value to the utility theory uses an unscientific measure, taken from 
Bentham, that places the focus of economics on individuals in a short and definite 
time frame. Secondly, his selective interpretation of Bentham’s utility built 
orthodox economics on a foundation that oversimplifies human behavior and 
systems. He fails to consider how maximizing individual utility impacts the future 
or effects those outside of one’s immediate relations. While Jevons attempts to 
make clear that some situations supersede his analysis, the widespread adoption of 
his theories among economists came with an overzealous commitment to the idea 
that anything concerning economic decisions does not impact others. Finally, 
Jevons overt disconnect from morality and ethics, a key component of the political 
economy, allowed future economists, who built on Jevons’ ideas, to perpetuate 
theories and implement policies devoid of moral consideration.  
Jevons’ lack of nuance, oversight, and blindered following of Bentham, 
combined with Bentham’s blunt explanation of all human behavior suggest that 
modern neoclassical economics stand on an unstable foundation as a science. Most 
disciplines that are considered scientific in nature are rooted in sound, observed, 
evolutionary theory and consider the ethical and moral implications of their actions 
and findings. Even sciences that many perceive to deal in fact and fiction, say 
biology or chemistry, ensure that their work is rooted in empirical traditions and 
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consider the ethical implications of the questions they ask and the results they find.  
Given that the neoclassical approach dominates today, in theory and in practice, it 
is worrisome that Jevons states plainly that it’s theory should be applied only to 
simple problems devoid of ethics and morality, and that his most central 
contribution, utility, was developed by someone outside the field whose primary 
professional focus was social control. Today’s economists may want to consider 
Jevons (1957, 29) own assertion that this theory was meant only to deal with 
“simple” problems when conducting what is often described as nuanced and 
technical research.   
Science is evolutionary, while Jevons’ mathematization of economics made 
the discipline static. Despite, Jevons’ (1957, 1-27) continued insistence throughout 
his first chapter, that the mathematization of economics was a step toward a more 
scientific study, the direction of the subject henceforth suggests the contrary. While 
the shift toward the utility theory of value gave economists more concrete figures 
and the ability to create graphs easy for the human mind to understand, it took 
away the ability to include power, class, or cooperation in economic analysis: the 
scientific foundations of the field, grown out of logic, philosophy, and history were 
disregarded under the guise of becoming more scientific.  
Although Jevons’ does appear cognizant of the potential implications of the 
shift he proposes, he appears committed to the idea that the shift is an 
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improvement. For example, Jevons (1957, 36) writes briefly on the uncertainty of 
future events – recognizing that future outcomes may play a role in present 
decision making – but proceeds to explain how these thoughts need only be 
considered in industries, like insurance, concerned with the future. Jevons’ 
contribution to economics was drastically reducing the scope while simultaneously 
convincing readers that the reduction in scope meant increased accuracy.  
By selectively using Bentham’s utility to reduce human behavior, and 
introducing equations and graphs that, under certain circumstances, successfully 
predicted slivers of social activity, Jevons convinced many that static thought was 
scientific. Making what must have been a convincing argument, Jevons (1957, 6) 
explains that economics, like physics or astronomy, measures quantities in inexact 
amounts, and thus should be mathematized. By suggesting economic 
measurements are nearly as precise of measurements of force or distance, Jevons 
implies that through mathematization, economics may become as precise. 
Economists, policymakers, and business owners latched on. Today, economic 
forecasts and models are often treated as precise sciences. This stems from Jevons 
use of utility.  
However, other sciences are more precise. When force is applied to a 
wrench, it may be difficult to distinguish between the amount of force down to 
hundredths of newtons, but measurements are nearly exact, and the wrench will 
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never act contrary. Conversely, a human being may consume ten apples every 
week for ten years and then abruptly change their consumption patterns. While the 
difference between the two may appear obvious, economics proceeded as if they 
were the same after the publication of Jevons’ book. A more subtle, but equally 
consequential, shift that occurred in economics starting with Jevons was the 
disconnection from morality.  
Jevons (1957, 29) explicitly states that his omission of fecundity, purity, and 
extent as qualifiers of utility stems from their moral implications. Explaining 
further, Jevons (1957, 29) makes clear that economics – as a science – is not meant 
to answer questions of morality writing, “These three last circumstances 
(fecundity, purity, and extent) are of high importance as regards the theory of 
morals; but they will not enter into the more simple and restricted problem which 
we attempt to solve in Economics.” The neoclassical revolution in economics 
began under the pretense that economics was devoid of morality, an asinine 
attitude still seen in business and policy making. No science is devoid of moral 
implication, and by stating economics, at its foundation, does not deal with 





Challenges Associated with Creating and Using Science 
Jevons’ use of Bentham and its subsequent impacts on economics provide an 
illustrative example of the difficulties of creating and using science. The 
introduction of the utility theory of value kickstarted the neoclassical revolution 
and sent economics in a new direction. In hopes of creating a more systematic 
economics, one that was more scientific, Jevons drastically reduced the field. An 
act antithetical to the advancement of a science. However unscientific, these ideas 
gained momentum in the mainstream, and ultimately became and remain the 
orthodoxy. Thus, over time, the minutiae of the underlying assumptions and 
decisions at the foundation go unexplored and unquestioned leading to the further 
advancement of economics down the path set forth by Jevons.  
 Creating systematic and cohesive methods and theories to explore any 
subject is incredibly difficult. Doing so when human action and decision making is 
involved proves even harder. Jevons, understanding the difficulty of creating new 
or offering advances to a science, commits firmly to his ideas. Two key choices, 
made under this zealous commitment to push science forward, led economics in a 
less scientific direction. In tandem, these choices highlight the difficulty of creating 
and using science.  
First, the mathematization set forth by Jevons shows how fraught creating 
science can be. In his decision that economics must undoubtedly be a mathematical 
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science if it was to be a science, Jevons (1957, 3) necessitates the ability to 
quantify anything associated with economic questions. Realizing the daunting 
nature of such as task, Jevons relies on Bentham’s utility. Bentham’s utility is 
notoriously inflexible, unverifiable, and unscientific. Specifically, Betham (1967, 
127) defends any behavior that appears contrary to his theory using circular 
reasoning, suggesting that any behavior outside what is predicted must ultimately 
still be some actor working to maximize their utility in a more uncommon fashion. 
In order to thoroughly integrate Bentham’s utility, Jevons decides to narrow 
Bentham’s idea to fit the narrow scope required by the need to measure every 
quantity. In an attempt to create a more systematic, rational, and measurable 
science, Jevons stripped economics of its nuance. A single short-sighted decision 
by one person produced hundreds of years of ramifications. 
Jevons’ second major idea was the shift away from the labor theory of value 
toward the utility theory of value. Here, there are lessons on the difficulty of using 
science. In describing this shift, Jevons (1957, 171) suggests that labor is simply a 
necessary pain incurred by individuals to ward off future pains. In isolation the 
idea is benign, taking a slightly different perspective on a long-accepted idea. 
Moving forward, as this shift in perspective was adopted by other economists, this 
shift manifests in the acceptance that economics is the study of individuals 
opposed to the study of societies. The more the idea is used and normalized, the 
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easier it is for future economists to accept it as truth. This has clearly been the case 
with Jevons’ shift away from the labor theory toward the utility theory. Many 
economists and lay people alike blindly accept the notion that economic activity 
can be chalked up to everyone individually maximizing their utility when in 
viewable reality they often view the contrary. The ease with which science is often 
accepted as truth, and the ramifications on people’s lives when the science is 
incorrect – in economics, the Great Depression and Financial Crisis come to mind 
– suggest that those who create and use science must understand the history of 
their science.  
In economics, foundational ideas are often taught as law despite their 
unscientific footing. Supply, demand, and the equilibrium price are described with 
words like, “natural” and “stable,” when in reality the underlying ideas –  like the 
maximization of utility by the rational actor looking to avoid pain and seek 
pleasure – were set forth by one person looking for a simpler way to conduct their 
work. Hence, the creation and use of science must happen critically, thoughtfully, 
and cautiously. If not, the proliferation of unscientific thinking and theories could 
stagnate an entire discipline as it has in neoclassical economics as illustrated by the 





This inquiry sought to establish that in his  The Theory of Political Economy, 
Stanley Jevons offers a selective interpretation of Jeremy Bentham’s notion of 
utility that generates long lasting implications. Jevons’ roots his thesis – that 
economics must be a mathematical science – in Bentham’s utility, the idea that all 
of human behavior is driven by the desire to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. 
In doing so, Jevons uses only four of seven qualifiers set forth by Bentham, stating 
plainly that any qualifier necessitating questions of morality lie outside the scope 
of economics. This decisions, marking the beginning of the neoclassical revolution, 
aimed economics toward a less scientific approach despite its intentions. 
Ultimately, Jevons’ ideas became, and remain, the orthodoxy. Despite one of the 
foundational thinkers acknowledging that his ideas are not adequate to answer 
questions concerning morality, those who use economics today continue to do just 
that.   
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